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“The Cold War was a 45-year-long Gray Zone Struggle.”1 – General Joseph L. Votel

I. What is the Gray Zone?
WHAT IS THE GRAY Z ONE?
Votel, General Joseph L. USA, Lieutenant General Charles T. Cleveland, USA (Ret.) and Will
Irwin. “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone.” JFQ 80, (1st Quarter, 2016). National
Defense University Press http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-ArticleView/Article/643108/unconventional-warfare-in-the-gray-zone/
General Votel provides an analytical look at what gray zones are and the primary role of
SOF in gray zone operations. Considering that gray zone operations are meant to be
low-profile, limited footprint and typically avoid direct, conventional conflict they are a
fertile ground for SOF operations. Gray zones are not limited to precision strikes or
fighting through proxies, but employ influence operations and “political warfare.”
General Votel continues to discuss the doctrine behind Unconventional Warfare (UW)
operations, providing examples from WWII to current times, and looks at what would be
considered a victory in a gray zone operation.
SSI “Outplayed-Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone.” U.S. Army War College, June 7,
2016. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1325
“In-short, threats emerging from the gray zone have a decidedly disruptive effect on
strategic risk calculations. Often, the risk associated with action and inaction appears to
be equally high and unpalatable. “
This report seeks to describe what the gray zone is and evaluate the United States’
capabilities of operating in the gray zone and countering other nations that excel in gray
zone actions. Conventional and traditional strategy means and methods cannot be
applied to gray zone challenges. The report predicts that the U.S. will continue to face
constant resistance and that it will mainly occur within the parameters of the gray zone.
In order to properly counter these actions, the report recommends changes in policy,
strategy, capabilities, operational plans and adaptation.

1

General Joseph L. Votel, USA, Lieutenant General Charles T. Cleveland, USA (Ret.) and Will Irwin. “Unconventional
Warfare in the Gray Zone.” JFQ 80, (1st Quarter, 2016). National Defense University Press, 102.
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/643108/unconventional-warfare-in-the-grayzone/
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Kapusta, CAPT. Philip. “The Gray Zone” Special Warfare 28 no. 4 (October-December 2015), 1925.
http://www.soc.mil/swcs/SWmag/archive/SW2804/October%202015%20Special%20W
arfare.pdf
Gray zone challenges are not a new occurrence. They may have had different
terminology previously, but the actions are the same with the added benefit of modern,
easily available, technology. The author argues that conventional warfare has become a
rarity whereas gray zone conflicts are the norm. The pressing concern is that being the
strongest military conventionally no longer guarantees victory or control over particular
situations. The U.S. spends close to $600 billion a year on defense but states with lessrobust spending abilities and non-state actors can successfully conduct operations in the
gray zone. While other states have more ambiguity of operations, the U.S. need not
become frustrated with gray zone operations. While the tools and abilities are already
present for the U.S. to operate better in the gray zone, the author recommends that
improvements be made in the “organizational, intellectual and institutional models” in
order to succeed.
Brands, Hal. “Paradoxes of the Gray Zone.” FPRI, February 5, 2016.
http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/paradoxes-gray-zone/
Gray zones in a sense encompass the activities that a state or non-state actor will
conduct in order to reap the most benefit from without having enough blatant or
flagrant clear-cut violation of an international standard resulting in them being held
accountable and being punished militarily. However, the all-encompassing everything
between peace and war definition of the gray zone can lead to misclassification of
conflict. The author advises not to put China’s island building program and the Islamic
State’s terror campaign under the same heading. Furthermore, he examines the
slippery nature of Gray Zone conflicts and how they can simultaneously in many ways be
detrimental and beneficial.
HYBRID WARFARE
Hoffman, Frank. Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac Institute for
Policy Studies, Virginia 2007.
http://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_01
08.pdf
Frank Hoffman describes hybrid warfare (a part of Gray Zone warfare in itself) as a “full
range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics
5|Page
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and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and
criminal disorder.” Hoffman provides an overview of what Hybrid warfare is, along with
its origins and development and its potential impact. Hybrid warfare is not solely the
province of state actors nor is it relegated to non-state groups. Hezbollah is used in
Hoffman’s writing as an example of hybrid warfare in that it uses a multitude of
conventional, irregular, and terror tactics together in a dangerous mixture.
Wither, James K. “Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare.” Connections: The Quarterly Journal 15, no.
2 (Spring 2016): 73-87,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1784582336?accountid=322.
This article covers the increasing focus on and analysis of hybrid warfare. It come more
into the public eye after the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014 and entered into general
policy discussions after that. Pre-2014 occurrences of hybrid war are evaluated and a
return to the Russian invasion of Crimea is made. The concept of hybrid war itself is
dissected, in that the terminology used is different outside of western countries but the
concept itself is the same. In conclusion, the author cautions that labels and theories
are not as important as adaptive strategy and planning that can more effectively
counter modern warfare.
COUNTERMEASURES
Freier, Nathan P., et. al. “Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone, A Report
Sponsored by the Army Capabilities Integration Center in Coordination with Joint Staff J39/Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment Branch.” U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies
Institute. June 7, 2016.
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1325
U.S. competitors pursuing meaningful revision or rejection of the current U.S.-led status
quo are employing a host of hybrid methods to advance and secure interests contrary to
those of the United States. These challenges employ unique combinations of influence,
intimidation, coercion, and aggression to incrementally crowd out effective resistance,
establish local or regional advantage, and manipulate risk perceptions in their favor. So
far, the United States has not come up with a coherent countervailing approach. It is in
this gray zone where the United States and its defense enterprise face systemic
challenges to U.S. position and authority. Gray zone competition and conflict present
fundamental challenges to U.S. and partner security and, consequently, should be
important pacers for U.S. defense strategy.
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Coffman, MAJ Sean, MAJ Rob Shumaker, and MAJ Jeff Givens. “Perception is Reality: SOF in the
Gray Zone.” Small Wars Journal / Naval Postgraduate School. June 2016.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/perception-is-reality-sof-in-the-gray-zone
This thesis examines two case studies of special operations forces (SOF) use in the gray
zone -- in Somalia in 1992-1993 and the Philippines in 2000-2015. Using the
bureaucratic politics model as a framework and evaluating players, decision games, and
outcomes, the choice to employ SOF is replayed and outcomes are evaluated in an
empirical light.
Kay, Larry. “Managing the Gray Zone is a Gray Matter Challenge.” Small Wars Journal. July 27,
2016. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/managing-the-gray-zone-is-a-gray-matterchallenge
This paper promotes an alternative approach to address problems in the gray zone,
which is to adopt a generative or systemic solution to ways in which to develop
strategies to manage gray zone competition by adapting officer career and education
tracks to create a more operationally and intellectually excellent officer corps. The gray
zone is a competition of ideas, and managing the gray zone requires intelligent
management of our intellectual capital, our gray matter.
“SOF Support to Political Warfare.” United States Army Special Operations Command. March
10, 2015.
http://www.soc.mil/swcs/ProjectGray/Support%20to%20Political%20Warfare%20White
%20Paper%20v2.3-RMT%20(10MAR2015)%20%20%20.pdf
By fully leveraging civilian power while embracing a small-footprint yet enduring
forward military presence, political warfare is politically, economically, and
diplomatically sustainable. The synchronized whole-of-government application of forms
of Unconventional Warfare, in support of Security Sector Assistance, diplomatic
engagement, economic measures, and cyber considerations, constitutes the twentyfirst-century “employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to
achieve its national objectives. Various solutions to leverage political warfare in
response to gray zone conflicts include developing doctrine, developing strategies, and
embracing the human domain. By establishing political warfare strategies, designating a
lead organization to coordinate and synchronize efforts at the national and deployed
echelons, and leveraging SOF Special Warfare and Surgical Strike capabilities, this blend
of a civilian-led Political Warfare campaign with SOF elements will lead to a fully
integrated response to gray zone conflicts.
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Echevarria II, Dr. Antulio J. “Operating in the Gray Zone: An Alternative Paradigm for U.S.
Military Strategy.” U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. April 4, 2016.
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1318
So-called gray zone wars are not new, but they have highlighted shortcomings in the
way the West thinks about war and strategy. This monograph proposes an alternative to
the U.S. military’s current campaign-planning framework, one oriented on achieving
positional advantages over rival powers and built around the use of a coerciondeterrence dynamic germane to almost all wars as well as to conflicts short of war. The
aim is to provide military strategists with a vehicle for thinking about out-positioning
rival parties rather than merely subduing them though kinetic force. By re-orienting our
thinking in terms of positioning, the author argues that we will find ourselves better
prepared to coerce or deter our competitors, two essential competencies for operating
in the gray zone.

II. Proxy Warfare
IRAN: LEBANON AND SYRIA
Nadimi, Farzin. “Iran’s Afghan and Pakistani Proxies: In Syria and Beyond?” Washington
Institute For Near East Policy. Policywatch 2677. August 22, 2016.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-afghan-and-pakistaniproxies-in-syria-and-beyond
As part of its renewed effort to export the Islamic Revolution through armed proxies,
Tehran has been recruiting and training Afghan and Pakistani fighters for Syria’s
battlefields, thereby giving them invaluable experience for potential future campaigns in
other regional countries.
Pollak, Nadav. “The Transformation of Hezbollah by Its Involvement in Syria.” Washington
Institute For Near East Policy. No. 35. August 2016.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote35Pollak-2.pdf
The reasoning behind Hezbollah’s Syrian involvement is detailed as well as its scope and
the characteristics of the group’s activity since then. Hezbollah’s domestic support,
regional ambitions, and future prospects are explored in depth.
Cragin, R. Kim. “Semi-Proxy Wars and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy.” Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism 38 no. 5 (March 25, 2015).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1018024
8|Page
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Syria has served as a proxy battleground for a number of different groups, both state
actors and irregular. What was once Jabhat al-Nusra was fighting for Al-Qaeda Central,
whereas Hezbollah, various Shiite militias, and the Quds forces are all fighting on behalf
of Iran.
CHINA:
MARITIME MILITIAS OVERVIEW

Erickson, Andrew S., and Conor M. Kennedy. “Irregular Forces at Sea: Not ‘Merely Fishermen’Shedding Light on China’s Maritime Militia.” CIMSEC, November 2, 2015.
http://cimsec.org/new-cimsec-series-on-irregular-forces-at-sea-not-merely-fishermenshedding-light-on-chinas-maritime-militia/19624
This article describes China’s use of merchant and fishing vessels to disrupt and impede
naval traffic in the South China Sea. The “maritime militia” as it is referred to consists of
workers from the maritime industry and fishermen that are specifically trained by the
Chinese government and deployed in situations where overt naval action would have to
high of a risk for backlash. These militia groups have been trained to fulfil multi-role
operations all with the assumed protection of still being classified as a civilian vessel.
SANYA CITY

---------“China’s Daring Vanguard: Introducing Sanya City’s Maritime Militia.” CIMSEC,
November 5, 2015. http://cimsec.org/chinas-daring-vanguard-introducing-sanya-citysmaritime-militia/19753
The opening part of a multi-part series, this article looks at one particular maritime
militia, that of Hainan Province. This particular group has been an integral part of
China’s maritime arsenal and with a more aggressive posture being undertaken as of
late, they have the potential to play an even greater role. It is strongly advised not to
underestimate these irregular forces and China’s will to use them as a tool to
circumvent existing FONOPS. The official name of this militia is the Sanya Fugang
Fisheries Co., Ltd. It is comprised mostly of local fishermen and has been at the fore of
China’s area denial and fleet harassment activities around the Spratly Islands. The
article continues on to describe several incidents in which this maritime militia was
deployed for the aforementioned purposes.
BAIMAJING PORT

---------“Trailblazers in Warfighting: The Maritime Militia of Danzhou.” CIMSEC, February 1,
2016. http://cimsec.org/trailblazers-warfighting-maritime-militia-danzhou/21475
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This article continues the report on the Hainan Island maritime militia’s, this time with a
focus on the Baimajing Fishing Port on the northwestern shore of the island. This
particular groups has served as the basis in military usage of civilian fishing fleets and is
a model for other maritime militias. The origins, activities, current and future role of the
militia out of the Baimajing port is detailed along with how they are striving to work
even closer with their militia counterparts.
TANMENHARBOR

--------- “Model Maritime Militia: Tanmen’s Leading Role in the April 2012 Scarborough Shoal
Incident. CIMSEC, April 21, 2016. http://cimsec.org/model-maritime-militia-tanmensleading-role-april-2012-scarborough-shoal-incident/24573
The Tanmen Fishing Harbor and its militia is featured I this article. The Tanmen militia
often received a higher level attention due to its frequent encounters with foreign
vessels. It has been a premier unit since its founding and has received encouragement
by Chinese President, Xi Jinping to expand and improve its equipment and areas of
operation. The article continues with a timeline of incidents featuring the Tanmen
militia, starring in 1985. One particular incident, Scarborough Shoal, between the
Tanmen militia and the Philippine Navy is presented in detail. The article concludes by
showing the increasing level of government support for the Tanmen militia based on the
multiple visits to the group from government officials.
------“From Frontier Frontline: Tanmen Maritime Militia’s Leading Role Pt .2” CIMSEC, May 17,
2016. http://cimsec.org/frontier-frontline-tanmen-maritime-militias-leading-role-pt2/25260
The second article focusing on the Tanmen maritime militia offers two more incidents in
which this force was utilized to accomplish military and political goals. In addition to the
activities of the group, its leadership and organizational structure are also presented.
COMMAND STRUCTURE

Erickson, Andrew S., and Conor M. Kennedy. “Directing China’s ‘Little Blue Men’: Uncovering
the Maritime Militia Command Structure.” AMTI, September 11, 2015.
https://amti.csis.org/directing-chinas-little-blue-men-uncovering-the-maritime-militiacommand-structure/
The Chinese maritime militias, mainly composed of fishing fleets, have become serious
impediments to foreign vessels and a frequent tool of the Chinese government. They
have served as an elite force in a wide set of supportive, defensive and to some degree,
offensive actions. Their command structure falls simultaneously within the local military
and the corresponding government partner. The mission goals are decided higher up
10 | P a g e
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while direct leadership occurs in the local People’s Armed Forces Departments (PAFD),
however, their direct command structure can change from mission to mission.
COUNTERMEASURES

------ “Countering China’s Third Sea Force: Unmask Maritime Militia before They’re Used Again.”
National Interest, July 6, 2016. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/countering-chinasthird-sea-force-unmask-maritime-militia-16860
The Maritime Militia fulfills a variety of roles spanning the spectrum of peacetime
coercion and wartime confrontation. This includes providing first-hand and the most upto-date intelligence to the navy during peacetime and providing the best logistical tasks
such as supplying food and water during wartime. Maritime Militia capabilities are
poised to expand further as Beijing’s desire to “win without fighting” through calibrated
South China Sea operations growth.
USE OF KURDS AND SYRIAN GROUPS IN PROXY WARFARE
Thornton, Rod. “The Kurds as Proxies in Iraq and Syria: A Problematic Relationship for Western
Powers.” Sustainable Security, April 20, 2016.
https://sustainablesecurity.org/2016/04/20/the-kurds-as-proxies-in-iraq-and-syria-aproblematic-relationship-for-western-powers/
Native to the region, the Kurds are an ideal candidate in the fight against ISIL as a
Western proxy as they are numerous, of a warrior-caste, and politically acceptable to
Western audiences. The Kurds have proven themselves to be the most effective against
ISIL in both Syria and Iraq and therefore, both groups have gained support from the
United States. The caveat here is that the KDP in Iraq and the YPD in Syria are on
conflicting sides ideologically and are both also fighting for what is in their individual
best interests. Factor in Turkey’s vested interest in keeping their local Kurdish group, the
PKK, at bay, the use of Kurds as proxies in Syria and Iraq makes for an increasingly
complex situation.
UNITED STATES USE OF PROXIES

Ford, Robert S. “U.S. Policy Toward Syria.” U.S. Department of State. October 31, 2013.
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/216163.htm
U.S. Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford provided testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in 2013 regarding the U.S. policy towards Syria. The U.S. policy is
to support the moderates in the opposition and to push forward on a political solution.
Heras, Nicholas A. “From the Bottom, Up: A Strategy for U.S. Military Support to Syria’s Armed
Opposition.” Center for a New American Security. April 2016.
11 | P a g e
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http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNASReportSyrianOpposition-160505.pdf
This policy recommendation suggests that the United States’ effort to arm the moderate
Syrian rebels should be accompanied by working with the rebels to join forces with
other moderate fighters to build a cohesive, moderate armed opposition institutions.
These institutions will become the center of gravity in their respective regions as they
marginalize or defeat ideological extremist organizations, ultimately being brought
together to form larger civil-military structures and govern the predominantly Sunni
rebel-ruled areas inside of Syria. These regional structures can then interact with the
remnants of the Assad regime and its loyalist forces to work toward achieving a longterm political solution to the Syrian civil war, such as a federalized Syria. While this
approach may seem complex and difficult to execute, there are already examples inside
Syria, especially in the south near the Jordanian border, where American strategy to
support the armed opposition has had the most success.
TURKEY’S CONCERN OVER USE OF KURDISH FORCES

Issa, Philip. “Syria’s Kurds: An embattled US Ally in a Complex Civil War.” AP. August 25, 2016.
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/1c6682e6682d4f809d67b1bcdfcec20e/syrias-kurdsembattled-us-ally-complex-civil-war
Turkey, displeased with the recent successes of Syrian Kurds, has entered the Syrian
conflict, sending tanks across the border to fight ISIL and demand the Kurds retreat from
their recently seized territory. The tensions between Turkey and the Kurds pit a NATO
ally against the most effective U.S. military proxy in Syria. The article further outlines
how the Syrian Kurds battled in the early stages of the conflict with competing forces
and ultimately made the correct political move to align with the group of U.S.-backed
Arab fighters known as the Syria Democratic Forces, putting themselves on the good
side of the United States.
TURKEY AND RUSSIA

Bacik, Gökhan. “Turkey and Russia’s Proxy War and the Kurds.” The German Marshall Fund of
the United States, January 21, 2016. http://www.gmfus.org/publications/turkey-andrussias-proxy-war-and-kurds
The policies of Turkey and Russia in the Middle East are mutually detrimental, especially
in Syria, where the dynamics of confrontation has almost generated a proxy war
between the two states, while the Kurds are becoming the critical third actor indicative
of a proxy war. Turkey’s ultimate goal of the Syrian conflict is to prevent the creation of
an autonomous Kurdish region along its border and Russia has propped up the Kurds in
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Syria as partners against radical groups and to confront and punish Turkey for shooting
down the Russian jet.

THE UNRELIABLE NATURE OF PROXY WARFARE
Weiss, Caleb. “Two U.S.-Backed Groups Clash in Northern Syria.” Long War Journal, August 29,
2016. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/08/2-us-backed-groups-clash-innorthernsyria.php?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Lo
ngWarJournalSiteWide+%28The+Long+War+Journal+%28Site-Wide%29%29
Proxy warfare is not always the most reliable means to an end, but it does provide the
opportunity for a state to advances its political goals without having to directly commit
its armed forces, which a much larger backlash or even lead to all out war. However,
these individual groups being utilized still have their own agendas and are willing to
cooperate only as long as it further advances their own cause. Jaysh al Tahrir, a group
falling under the political umbrella of the Free Syrian Army (which receives material
support from the U.S.) and the Kurdish People’s Protection Unit (YPG) which is the lead
group of the Syrian Democratic Forces, which is also receiving U.S. support have clashed
regarding territory. Jaysh al Tahrir is closely tied to several Turkish-backed Islamist
groups and has taken two towns from the YPG (which captured them back from ISIS) in
order to prevent them from gaining any more ground nearer to the Turkish border. The
YPG is of particular concern to Turkey due to it being the Syrian branch of the PKK.
Chulov, Martin. “Turkey’s Syria Offensive Shows how Each Party is Fighting its Own War.” The
Guardian, September 2, 2016.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/02/turkey-syria-offensive-each-party-isfighting-its-own-war-kurds-us-isis
Turkey sent tanks and troops into Syria at the end of August with a stated goal of going
after ISIL in the border town of Jarabulus; however its primary, unspoken goal was to
stop the Kurds - supported by the United States - from gaining any more territory in
northern Syria. While all three parties public primary objective is to stop ISIL, each party
involved is fighting its own war with incompatible goals.
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III. State Actors
Russia
RUSSIAN MARITIME
COERCION AND PROVOCATIONS

Hicks, Kathleen., Andrew Metrick, Lisa Sawyer Samp and Kathleen Weinberger. “Undersea
Warfare in Northern Europe.” CSIS International Security Program. July 2016.
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/160721_Hicks_UnderseaWarfare_Web.pdf
Russian undersea activity has reached a level it has not been at since the end of the Cold
War. A more aggressive Russia has utilized submarine deployments in other nations’
territorial waters, particularly in those of Scandinavian countries that are on the fence
regarding NATO, as a form of intimidation, coercion and area denial. This tactic allows
Russia to increase its theoretical area of control and accomplish its political goals
without escalating to direct conflict. In addition, it announces that Russia is willing to
advance its will while other nations are required to be cautious and defensive. The
report continues after its initial look into Russia’s goals by then evaluating its equipment
and capabilities followed by suggestions on how NATO nations can counter a resurgent
Russia.
MEDITERRANEAN

Altman, Jonathan. “Russian A2/AD In the Eastern Mediterranean: A Growing Risk.” Naval War
College Review 69 no. 1. (Winter, 2016).
https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/4ac8b59c-4634-44b3-af06dee0203d6c67/Russian-A2-AD-in-the-Eastern-Mediterranean---A-Gro.aspx
This report looks at the potential for Russia to utilize similar anti-access and area-denial
techniques in the Mediterranean as it does in the Baltic and North Sea. The Russian
Black Sea Fleet is one of Russia’s larger fleets and it outnumbers the U.S. Sixth Fleet in
the region. The presence of Russian forces in the Mediterranean strengthens Moscow’s
end game of pushing the U.S. from the region. This added military support could allow
Russia to present themselves as the dominant power especially if backed by appropriate
political maneuvers. A “decoupling” of allies could be achieved if Russia exploited
Greece’s economic crisis, gave additional arms to Egypt and pushed closer ties with
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Turkey’s increasingly authoritarian government. With Russia adding its fleet into the
mix, it can potentially box the U.S. out of the Middle East on land, sea and politically.

RUSSIA IN UKRAINE
HYBRID WAR AND MEDIA

Koffman, Michael and Matthew Rojansky. “A Closer look at Russia’s ‘Hybrid War.’” Kennan
Cable no.7, April 2015. Kennan Institute.
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no7-closer-look-russiashybrid-war
This article closer analyzes the common view of Hybrid Warfare and Russia’s actions
during the Crimean invasion and the invasion of Eastern Ukraine. Russia extensively
utilized destabilizing media broadcasts and propaganda to prepare for and solidify their
gains in each offensive. Russia’s media campaigns are set on a larger goal or removing
what it sees as Western dominance of the media and to question those perspectives,
information is used as a form of national power. The authors argue that the focus
should not be on trying to classify such events but in learning how to counter a state like
Russia using a wide range of abilities to implement its will.
GREEN MEN TACTICS

Altman, Dan. “The Long History of ‘Green Men’ Tactics - And How They Were Defeated.” War
On The Rocks. March 17, 2016. http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/the-long-history-ofgreen-men-tactics-and-how-they-were-defeated/
In both Crimea and eastern Ukraine, Russia’s signature tactic has been the use of “Green
Men,” or deniable forces, which has in turn become a central part of gray zone conflicts.
Although highlighted by Russian conflicts in the last two years, deploying deniable forces
is a recurring tactics throughout history.
NON-LINEAR WARFARE

Kasapoglu, Can. “Russia’s Renewed Military Thinking: Non-Linear Warfare and Reflexive
Control.” NATO Defense College, Research Division. No. 121, November 2015.
http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/Articles/russia's%20renewed%20Military%2
0Thinking.pdf
Western view of hybrid warfare focuses on any occurrence being “multi-modality”
whereas the Russian strategy concurring with this heading is more fluid and focusing on
achieving an end goal as opposed to fitting into specific parameters.
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DESTABILIZING WITH CIVIL UNREST

Whitmore, Brian. “How To Manufacture A War.” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. August 26,
2016. http://www.rferl.org/content/how-to-manufacture-a-war/27947359.html
Recordings of conversations between Kremlin aide Sergei Glazyev and proxies in Ukraine
highlight the specific instructions he gave them to instigate unrest in Donetsk, Kharkiv,
Zaporizhzhya, and Odessa as early as February 2014 -- before Russia had even annexed
Crimea. In turn, Russia had managed to stir up enough unrest in certain pockets of
eastern Ukraine to justify its state and non-state military support for separatists.
CULTURE WARFARE/COERCION

Krekό, Péter., Lóránt Győri, Jakub Janda, Ondřej Kundra, Grigorij Mesežnikov, Juraj Mesík,
Maciej Szylar and Anton Shekhovtsov. “The Weaponization of Culture: Kremlin’s
Traditional Agenda and the Export of Values to Central Europe.” Political Capital
Institute, August 4, 2016.http://www.politicalcapital.hu/wpcontent/uploads/PC_reactionary_values_CEE_20160727.pdf
Russian “culture warfare” has been and is being utilized not only to promote itself as the
champion of traditional values and demonize the West but to export these pro-Russian/
“traditional” values to neighboring countries. These values campaigns, if successful will
spark a desire in ethnic Russian abroad and their Slavic counterparts to embrace Russian
political ideals and guidance. These values more importantly serve to bolster the growth
of political groups within these neighboring countries that espouse illiberal, antidemocratic and authoritarian views that are more in line with the Russian government’s
initiatives. A combination of outside events, organizations, Russian language and foreign
language media, and the availability of Russian cultural and pro-Kremlin materials are
utilized to spread this cultural coercion. A particularly effective impact of this campaign
is increased support for Russia in far-right political parties active in Baltic and Eastern
European governments.
PROPAGANDA

Paul, Christopher., and Miriam Matthews. “The Russian ‘Firehose of Falsehood’ Propaganda
Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It.” RAND Corporation. 2016.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html
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The Russian propaganda model is high-volume and multichannel, and it disseminates
messages without regard for truth. It is also rapid, continuous, and repetitive, and it
lacks commitment to consistency. Traditional counter-propaganda approaches will likely
be inadequate in this context. More effective solutions can be found in the same
psychology literature that explains the surprising success of the Russian propaganda
model and its messages.
Chen, Adrian. “The Agency.” New York Times Magazine. June 2, 2015.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html
From a nondescript office building in St. Petersburg, Russia, an army of well-paid “trolls”
has tried to wreak havoc all around the Internet -- and in real-life American
communities.
Walker, Shaun. “Salutin’ Putin: inside a Russian troll house.” Guardian. April 2, 2015.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/02/putin-kremlin-inside-russian-trollhouse
Former workers tell how hundreds of bloggers are paid to flood forums and social
networks at home and abroad with anti-Western and pro-Kremlin comments.
PROXY POLITICAL GROUPS

Lutsevych, Orysia. “Agents of the Russian World: Proxy Groups in the Contested
Neighbourhood.” Chatham House. Russian and Eurasia Programme. April 2016.
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/201604-14-agents-russian-world-lutsevych.pdf
Anxious about losing ground to Western influence in the post-Soviet space and the
ousting of many pro-Russia elites by popular electoral uprisings, the Kremlin has
developed a wide range of proxy groups in support of its foreign policy objectives.
Russia employs a vocabulary of ‘soft power’ to disguise its ‘soft coercion’ efforts aimed
at retaining regional supremacy. This network of pro-Kremlin groups establish
alternative discourses to confuse decision-making where it is required, and act as
destabilizing forces by uniting paramilitary groups and spreading aggressive
propaganda.
Vojtiskova, Vladislava., Vit Novotny, Hubertus Schmid-Schmidsfelden, and Kristina Potapova.
“The Bear in Sheep’s Clothing: Russia’s Government-Funded Organisations in the EU.”
Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies. July 2016.
http://www.martenscentre.eu/sites/default/files/publication-files/russia-gongos.pdf
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This paper sheds light on organizations operating in Europe that are funded by the
Russian government, whether officially or unofficially. These include governmentorganized nongovernmental organizations (GONGOs), non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), and think tanks. Their goal is to shift European public opinion towards a positive
view of Russian politics and policies, and towards respect for its great power ambitions.
These organizations use soft power as a vehicle to rely more on coercion than
attraction. This paper reveals the broad range of methods and institutions that the
Russian government is using to influence decision-makers and public opinion in the EU.
COUNTERMEASURES

De Liedekerke, Arthur. “The rise of paramilitary groups in Central and Eastern Europe.” New
Eastern Europe. January 18, 2016. http://neweasterneurope.eu/articles-andcommentary/1862-the-rise-of-paramilitary-groups-in-central-and-eastern-europe
Europe has seen a surge in popularity of paramilitary units in countries directly affected
or alarmed by the violence in Ukraine and the large influx of refugees. While some
groups operate in parallel with regular military units, others have strikingly different
motives and far-right ideologies.
Lucas, Edward and Peter Pomeranzev. “Winning the Information War: Techniques and Counterstrategies to Russian Propaganda in Central and Eastern Europe.” Center for European
Policy Analysis / Legatum Institute. August 2, 2016.
https://cepa.ecms.pl/files/?id_plik=2715
This report analyzes the impact of Russian disinformation by drawing on dozens of case
studies seeing the employment of Russian information warfare tools as well as the
political forces, civil society actors, businesses, and public figures who use them. It also
looks at several examples of Russian policies which have been enacted using
disinformation: interventions in decision-making in Lithuania; fomenting insurrection in
eastern Ukraine; general denigration of Latvia’s international reputation; developing
native pro-Kremlin media outlets in the Czech Republic and Estonia; and supporting farright and ultranationalist movements and sentiments in Poland. The report concludes
with a 13-point recommendation plan to target Kremlin disinformation, strengthen
media in democracies, and educate audiences.
RUSSIA IN SYRIA
McDermott, Roger. “Russia’s Application of Military Power in Syria.”. Eurasia Daily Monitor 13
no. 41. March 1, 2016. Jamestown Foundation
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45149&tx_ttnews%5Bb
ackPid%5D=7&cHash=e541e940817a6e05fd3be42885792206
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Russia’s military operations in Syria are, in essence, about applying asymmetric warfare
approaches through testing and rehearing the use of limited military power to alter the
balance of power into Bashar al-Assad’s favor. Information warfare, escalation
dominance, anti-access/area denial, air defense protection, and training and equipping
the Syrian army are some of the operations to achieve limited war aims by asymmetric
means.

Iran
IRAN MARITIME
Ryan, Missy., and Thomas Gibbons-Neff. “Navy Patrol Ship Fires Warning Shots at Iranian Vessel
in one of Several Confrontations.” Washington Post, August 25, 2016.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/08/25/u-s-navy-callshigh-speed-approach-by-iranian-ships-dangerous-harassment/
Iranian small boats have utilized swarming tactics to harass and impede U.S. Navy
vessels. Several additional recent Iranian provocation/area denial actions have occurred.
IRAN DURING THE IRAQI INSURGENCY
OVERVIEW

Beehner, Lionel., and Greg Bruno. “Iran’s Involvement in Iraq.” Council on Foreign Relations,
March 3, 2008. http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-involvement-iraq/p12521
This report by the Council on Foreign Relations breaks down how Iran is involved in Iraq
and it provides a concise and inclusive overview of the situation. The report covers Iran’s
military, religious, economic, and social involvement in Iraq as well as addressing Iran’s
motivations for getting involved in Iraq.
FUNDS AND MONETARY SUPPORT

“Military Official: Iranian Millions Funding Insurgency.” CNN, September 28, 2006.
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/09/28/iraq.iran/
A senior U.S. military official is quoted saying a Shiite militia involved in the warfare
between Sunni and Shiites in Iraq has received millions of dollars and an assortment of
weaponry from Iran in order to retain some influence with the victorious group in Iraq.
WEAPONS AND MATERIAL

Roggio, Bill. “Evidence of Iran Supplying Weapons, Expertise to Iraqi Insurgents.” Long War
Journal, February 11, 2007.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/02/evidence_of_iran_sup.php
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Captured Iranians confirmed that Iran had been smuggling sophisticated explosive
devices and weaponry to multiple Iraqi insurgent groups. Markings on the explosively
formed projectiles and mortars made U.S. suspicious of Iranian involvement but the
capture of Iranians in Irbil possessing documents confirmed suspicions. The article also
quotes an unnamed defense official that the activities must be coming from the senior
levels of the Iranian government as the operational commander of the Al-Qods brigade,
the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps specialized force that reports to Iran’s Supreme
Leader, was among those captured.
O’Keefe, Ed., and Joby Warrick. “Weapons Prove Iranian Role in Iraq, U.S. says.” Washington
Post, July 5, 2011. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/war-zones/weapons-proveiranian-role-in-iraq-us-says/2011/07/05/gHQAUnkmzH_story.html
Senior U.S. officials are quoted saying that Iranian backed militias in Iraq are using more
sophisticated weapons than in the past to target U.S. troops and military installations in
Iraq. Forensic testing performed on weapons used in deadly attacks on U.S. troops
proved that the weapons are coming from Iran as insurgents are making no effort to
remove the weapons identification numbers proving their Iranian origin.
TRAINING

Gourley, Scott R. “MNF-I outlines Iranian Support for Iraqi ‘Special Groups’.” Jane’s Defence
Weekly, March 20, 2008. https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1176536
Spokesperson for the Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I) indicated that there was
evidence that proves Iraqi operatives are being trained inside of Iran and sent back into
Iraq and form small cells that are carrying out much of the violence against Coalition and
Iraqi security forces. He notes that the intention of these special groups is to keep Iraq
just destabilized enough that Iraq would not pose a military threat to Iran.
“Iran Training Iraqi Insurgent Groups, General Says: Quds Force Provides Training, Funds and
Arms.” Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc, July 3, 2007.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/190021082?pq-origsite=summon
This article outlines the extent of Iranian support to Iraqi insurgents including the
involvement of Hezbollah officials. The article further highlights that the Quds Force, an
elite unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, provides up to $3 million per month to
fund insurgent operations.
ASSERTING INFLUENCE

Cochrane, Marisa. “Special Groups Regenerate.” The Institute for the Study of War, August 29,
2008. http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/reports/IraqReport11.pdf
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This report examines the patterns and trends of the Iranian-backed militias known as
Special Groups. The Coalition and Iraqi Forces were able to force the leaders of these
groups back into Iran, it is likely that they will return to Iraq to rebuild their networks
and adopt new tactics.
Felter, Joseph and Brian Fishman. “Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and “Other Means”.”
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, October 13, 2008.
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Iranian-Strategy-inIraq.pdf
This paper details the objectives, methods, and expansiveness of the Iranian attempts
to affect policy and politics in Iraq through both historical context and strategic
motivation for Iranian actions.

China
CHINA’S ISLAND BUILDING
“Island Tracker.” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) https://amti.csis.org/islandtracker/
The Island Tracker, developed and maintained by the Asia Maritime Transparency
Initiative, provides a database of satellite imagery and brief summaries regarding the
reclamation and development of reefs and by China and Vietnam.
REASONS FOR ISLAND DEVELOPMENT

Dutton, Peter. “A Maritime or Continental Order for Southeast Asia and the South China Sea?”
From an Address at Chatham House, London, U.K. February 16, 2016. Featured in Naval
War College Review 69, no. 3. (Summer, 2016), 5-13.
https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/b3e85931-7139-49f9-8d93-6d5b53826a37/AMARITIME-OR-CONTINENTAL-ORDER-FOR-SOUTHEAST-ASIA.aspx
Peter Dutton, director of the U.S. Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute,
presents potential reasons behind and the ramifications of China’s Island building in the
South China Sea.
THE THREE WARFARES

Kania, Elsa. “The PlA’s Latest Strategic Thinking on the Three Warfares.” China Brief 16, no. 13
(August 22, 2016). Jamestown Foundation.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45723&tx_ttnews%5Bb
ackPid%5D=7&cHash=229badbe854a0bdac91aaf401e3f9744
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China is attempting to portray the U.S. as the aggressor in what is being called the
“militarization” of the South China Sea. China claims that it is the one upholding
maritime law whereas the U.S. is using an aggressive policy. The author describes how
China is conducting this campaign through the “Three Warfares,” which are: Public
Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare, and Legal Warfare.

IV. Cyber
CYBER TARGETING
Schmitt, Michael N. “The Law of Cyber Targeting.” Naval War College Review 68 no. 2(Spring,
2015). https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/05986280-7072-4038-a253560105093fbe/The-Law-of-Cyber-Targeting.aspx
Cyber-based attacks were not a revolutionary occurrence when they entered the public
eye during the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia. Cyber operations are not restricted to
professional, state-sponsored groups, but are widely utilized by irregular groups and
individuals. While these actors are not necessarily answerable to any authority,
legitimate state actors are. This piece evaluates the application of international law in
terms of cyber-targeting by state actors. Major aspects that are taken into effect include
what the target is, the weapon (or software) used, and any collateral damage.
See also the : the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare from the
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), Tallinn, Estonia.
https://ccdcoe.org/research.html
ATTACKS ON FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
Groll, Elias. “Spear Phishing In Tehran.” Foreign Policy. August 9, 2016.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/09/spear-phishing-in-tehran/
Researchers have found evidence that Iranian hackers, responsible for the cyber attacks
on Saudi Aramco computers and American banks in retaliation for cyber attacks on
Iranian nuclear centrifuges, are now using those same tools against the more
defenseless human rights groups and civil societies as a key tool in the regime’s attempt
to maintain power.
THEFT OF GOV. EMPLOYEE DATA

Adams, Michael. “Why the OPM Hack IS Far Worse Than You Imagine.” Lawfare. March 11,
2016. https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-opm-hack-far-worse-you-imagine
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The U.S. Office of Personnel Management data breach was exposed in June 2015 and
involves the greatest theft of sensitive personal data in history. But, to date, neither the
scope nor the scale of the breach has been fully aired.
POLITICAL SYSTEM ATTACKS
Rojansky, Matthew. “Tinker Tailor Soldier Hacker: The Russian Factor in the DNC Email
Scandal.” Kennan Institute. July 27, 2016. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/tinkertailor-soldier-hacker-the-russian-factor-the-dnc-email-scandal
This article looks at the motives behind the Russian hacking of the DNC emails. The
author speculates that the end goal was to show the vulnerability of the American
political system. Russia suspected that the U.S. influenced events in Russian elections, so
Putin wants to show that it can return the favor.
“Internet Trolling as a hybrid warfare tool: the case of Latvia.” NATO Strategic Communications
Centre of Excellence. February 2016. http://www.stratcomcoe.org/internet-trollinghybrid-warfare-tool-case-latvia-0
Russia is deploying social media trolls in an attempt to affect political change across
Europe. They are often identified by their poor grammar, repetition of content, and IP
addresses. These paid Russian bloggers flood the Internet with comments favorable to
Russian interests, paranoid conspiracy theories against the West and destabilizing
messages aimed at Russian speaking members of Baltic countries. This study provides
an in-depth look at Russia’s online political and cultural coercion campaign. Latvia is a
frequent target and therefore is the focus of this study.
AGAINST OPPOSITION
Hulcoop, Adam., Bahr Abdul Razzak, John Scott-Railton, Katie Kleemola, and Matt Brooks.
“Group5: Syria and the Iranian Connection.” Citizen Lab. August 2, 2016.
https://citizenlab.org/2016/08/group5-syria/
This report describes an elaborately staged malware operation with targets in the Syrian
opposition. The operators use a range of techniques to target Windows computers and
Android phones with the apparent goal of penetrating the computers of well-connected
individuals in the Syrian opposition. The operators seem comfortable with Iranian
Persian dialect tools and appear to have run elements of the operation from Iranian IP
addresses
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DRONE USAGE
Blanford, Nicholas. “How off-the-shelf drones are changing war in Syria and Lebanon.” Christian
Science Monitor. August 16, 2016. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/MiddleEast/2016/0816/How-off-the-shelf-drones-are-changing-war-in-Syria-and-Lebanon
A recent video purportedly shows a mini-drone operated by Hezbollah dropping
munitions on Syrian rebels in northern Syria, highlighting the ease with which militants
can turn a mini-drone into a weapon.
ONLINE PROPAGANDA AND RECRUITMENT
Koerner, Brendan I. “Why ISIS is Winning the Social Media War.” Wired. April 2016.
http://www.wired.com/2016/03/isis-winning-social-media-war-heres-beat
ISIL is as much a media conglomerate as a fighting force. ISIL innovates its branding
across social media platforms to crowdsource its distribution, inspire real-world action,
and steer conversations on- and off-line.
Frenkel, Sheera. “Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About How ISIS Uses The Internet.”
Buzzfeed. May 12, 2016. https://www.buzzfeed.com/sheerafrenkel/everything-youever-wanted-to-know-about-how-isis-uses-the-i
As ISIL continues to attract supporters from around the globe, the group has found a
way to exploit any online platform that exists, from launching cyber attacks to
publishing encryption advice to luring recruits through dating sites.
Berger, J.M. “Tailored Online Interventions: The Islamic State’s Recruitment Strategy.” CTC
Sentinel 8, No. 10. October 23, 2015. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wpcontent/uploads/2015/10/CTCSentinel-Vol8Iss1036.pdf
This article examines the methodical approach ISIL takes to target and recruit its
prospects online.
CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS
Kruithof, Kristy, Judith Aldridge, David Decary Hetu, Megan Sim, Elma Dujso, and Stijn Hoorens.
“Internet-Facilitated Drug Trade.” RAND Corporation. August 2016.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1607.html
The Internet’s potential role in facilitating the drug trained first gained mass attention
with the rise and fall of the Silk Road in October 2013. Today, there are around 50 so24 | P a g e
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called cryptomarkets and vendor shops where anonymous sellers and buyers find each
other to exchange illicit contraband.
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